

Arthur Siddharta Sanjiv Ahluwalia Vania Diez-Canseco



# **Executive Summary**

<b>airbnb</b>	5-Year IRR: 22.8%	5-Year MOIC: 2.79x	5-Ye	ear Targ	et Price:	\$322.0				
Company		<b>Airbnb, Inc.</b> is a leading house sharing platform with a community of 4 million hosts who have accommodated over 1 billion guest arrivals. Airbnb offers over 6.6 million accommodations across more than 100,000 cities								
Key Financials	Market Capitalization: \$78.5Bn Enterprise Value: \$70.9Bn (4/21 2022 Revenue: \$8.4Bn 2022 FCF: \$3.2Bn									
Why Now?	headwinds, and regulatory threa ABNB at a <b>47</b> % discount to its AT	ort-term pressure from the street duts. These concerns in addition to the H of \$216.84. We believe this create pace with almost unlimited future gr	blanket teches a unique o	nology sto pportunity	ck sell-off has	priced				
Investment Factors	drive significant upside with a base belief is driven by three investm  1 Attractive returns and low base Differentiated customer acquired.	o grow listings, superior customer active grow listings, superior customer active grows arriers to entry for hosts will drive guisition model drives superior unit eate formidable barriers to entry and	increase in s rowth in listing economics to	stock price ngs and nig other OTA	over 5 years. thts booked platforms					
Target Price & Returns	Exit Date: December 2027 Entry Price: \$115.5 5-Year Price Target: \$322.0 5-Year IRR: 22.8% 5-Year MOIC: 2.79x	F. Voor Drice	<b>13.9%</b> Street	<b>-0.3%</b> Bear	<b>22.8%</b> Base	33.8% Bull				

5-Year Price

Target:

\$114.0

\$221.4

\$322.0


\$495.7

# Airbnb, Inc. (ABNB) - Company Overview

#### **Business Description**

- Airbnb, founded in 2007, operates and manages an online marketplace that connects hosts and guests to book spaces and experiences
- Airbnb attracts new hosts organically. In Q4 2022, 36% of new hosts were prior guests (33% in Q4 2021)
- The primary revenue growth drivers for Airbnb between 2019 and 2022 have been: i) ADRs (61% of revenue growth), ii) nights and experiences booked (27% of revenue growth), and iii) take rate (11% of revenue growth)
- Key Operating Metrics (2022):
  - Number of hosts: +4mm
  - Active listings: 6.6mm
  - Nights and experiences booked: 394mm
  - Global GBV: \$63,212mm (ADR: \$160.4/night)
  - Revenue take rate: 13.29%

#### **Bookings and Revenue Breakdown (FY'2022)**




#### **ABNB Capitalization**

ABNB Capitalization			
Figures in US\$mm		Amount	Multiple
Cash & Investments	Avg. Int. Rate	9,622	FY'22 Leverage
Debt	0.20%	1,987	1.1x
Net Debt		-7,635	
Basic Shares Out.		637	
Option Dilution		43	_
Total Dil. Shares Out.		680	
			FY'22 EPS Mult.
Share Price		\$115.50	41.5x
Market Capitalization		78,540	
			FY'22 EBITDA Mult.
<b>Enterprise Value</b>		70,905	37.7x
EBITDA (FY'22)		1,883	
Net Income (FY'22)		1,893	

#### **Historical Share Price Performance**



#### **ABNB Share Price and Valuation – Since IPO**



## **ABNB: Key Debates**

**Key Issues** 

#### **Street View**

**Our View** 



Supply Constraints Airbnb's inability to increase supply will cause revenue growth to decelerate

 Recent product improvements streamlined host onboarding and grew listings by 16% in Q4 2022

 Platform model positions ABNB strongly against hotel competitors, who are growing listings by 3-5% because of funding and construction bottlenecks



Short-term economic headwinds

Airbnb faces risks of declining travel demand in FY'23-24 due to economic headwinds

- Economic stress compels hosts to list properties for extra income and guests to choose Airbnb for lower prices, making ABNB recession resistant
- 40% of hosts use Airbnb "to make ends meet"
- Price is most often the traveler's top consideration



Safety and Regulatory Hurdles

Safety issues and regulatory pushback in urban areas could limit Airbnb's growth potential

- ABNB leverages AI to flag risky guests and bookings, reducing its incidents compared to Vrbo
- Most urban regulations cap number of nights per host, adversely impacting large property managers, rather than Airbnb's core host, who lists their property for 65 days on average as an additional source of income



Competition from OTA's

Entry of Vrbo and Booking.com into the alternative accommodation space can slow Airbnb's growth and put pressure on take rates. Booking is a formidable competitor, is well capitalized, and can gain market share against ABNB

- 72.0% of Airbnb's listings are exclusive, and ABNB has a strong moat driven by superior products
- Airbnb has built a category and matching system that provides a more personalized experience for guests and higher booking success for hosts
- Traditional OTA's are optimized for hotels and are not as equipped to provide a P2P sharing platform



TAM

ABNB is an alternative accommodation provider to a \$1Tn TAM (\$800Bn of Lodging and \$240Bn of intravel experiences)

- 20% of ABNB nights come from long-term listings. ABNB is blurring the line between travel and furnished rentals
- Shift towards LT rentals creates additional \$1.2Tn of TAM in the U.S. alone

# **ABNB: Call Options for Transformative Growth (not included in Base Case)**

#### **Call Options**



Living on Airbnb

(\$13.5Bn EBIT Uplift)



Take rate opportunities

(\$3.0Bn EBIT Uplift)



Apartment Swapping on Airbnb

(\$2.4Bn EBIT Uplift)



Payments **Products** 

(\$2.4Bn EBIT Uplift)

#### Research

- Brian called out a "Living on Airbnb" trend. Now 21% of Airbnb's nights are long-term rentals
- Current and former employees describe Airbnb as not just rentals, but "plug & play" real estate
- Use cases include college housing, internships, international work, and "digital nomadism"
- Airbnb has many potential product offerings to increase take rate
- Opportunities discussed by management include travel insurance, sponsored listings, cleaning services platform, and pricing analytics
- Airbnb has partnered with large real estate developers to offer "Airbnb Friendly" apartments
- These buildings allow residents to rent out their apartments 60-180 days a year
- This was announced winter '22 and has already grown from 170 to 250 apartment buildings
- Airbnb processed over \$60Bn of payments in '22
- Former employees discussed host payment in "Airbnb Credits". Superhosts already receive Airbnb Credits as a status bonus every year
- Airbnb started offering immediate payment for 1.5% of bookings (fee capped at \$15)
- Airbnb is hiring talent from Apple Pay/Wallets

#### **Potential Impact**

- There are ~20mm college students enrolled in the U.S. If 1.3mm of these students<sup>(1)</sup> used an Airbnb, this adds 390mm nights per year<sup>(2)</sup>
- There are 17mm Americans who identify as digital nomads<sup>(3)</sup>, growing 32% Y/Y. Getting 2mm on Airbnb adds 600mm nights per year<sup>(2)</sup>
- Assuming \$100Bn of GBV, 1% increase of take rate from analytics adds \$970mm EBIT
- Insurance is 10% of trip cost. 25% commission and 25% uptake, adds \$606mm EBIT
- Assuming \$10Bn of cleaning spend and 15% take rate, this opportunity adds \$1.5Bn EBIT
- There are ~40mm Americans living in apartments. Bringing an additional 10% of these apartments online would double number of hosts
- Assuming 50 nights traveled per resident, and 50% of those nights on Airbnb, this would add 100mm nights booked and \$2.4Bn EBIT<sup>(4)</sup>
- If hosts keep 25% of GBV as travel credits, this could add \$1Bn EBIT (\$100Bn GBV, \$33.3Bn cash, 3% rate of return)
- If 25% of hosts opt in for immediate payment, this could add \$375mm EBIT
- Buy-Now-Pay-Later could add \$1Bn EBIT (\$100Bn GBV \* 10% uptake \* 10% average fees)

Transformative call options enable ABNB to capture an additional EBIT of \$21.3Bn

#### **Investment Thesis**

Unique opportunity to buy a high-quality business at an attractive price. We believe ABNB is at an inflection point where they have reached critical mass and are now focused on taking market share in high growth markets:

- 1 Attractive returns and low barriers to entry for hosts will drive growth in listings and nights booked
  - · Hosting is highly lucrative with 15%+ IRRs, incredibly easy to do, and underpenetrated
  - With product enhancements, Airbnb is accelerating new listings and growing supply faster than key competitors
  - Robust supply growth further enhances Airbnb's value proposition, driving additional adoption and share gains
- 2 Differentiated customer acquisition model drives superior unit economics to other OTA platforms
  - Airbnb attracts 90% unpaid traffic to its site, creating unit economics far more attractive than that of its competitors
  - This allows Airbnb to generate 66.7% EBIT margins for every incremental night booked, compared to 54.3% for Booking and 41.8% for Expedia
- Airbnb's network effects create formidable barriers to entry and global scale advantages
  - Airbnb's composition of individual hosts, primary residences, and exclusive listings make it the only true P2P home sharing platform
  - With a significant mix of international travel, Airbnb can leverage its global network of hosts and guests to win in each market globally

ABNB benefits significantly from industry tailwinds, hotels losing market share, and superior unit economics that drive share price upside of 178.8% and IRRs of 22.8% over 5 years

# Attractive returns and low barriers to entry for hosts will drive growth in listings and nights booked

#### **Short Term Rental Opportunity**





**~\$400k** Annual revenue of renting an NYC townhouse on ABNB



**~\$160k** expenses to operate townhouse



**~\$100k** of cash flows after debt service to ABNB host

#### Short term rentals provide ~15%+ IRRs to hosts

"Investors are often surprised when we show them our IRR's, but rentals is truly an amazing business as people always come to NYC"

ABNB New York Super Host, '23

#### **Private Room Opportunity**





**~\$1,776** Annual incremental cost of owning a 3-bed vs a 2-bed house



~\$8,000 Annual incremental revenue of renting out additional bedroom to ABNB

# Incremental rooms provide additional ~\$6,000 of free cash flow annually to owners

"ABNB has helped us pay off our mortgage and generate additional income from our extra room during high seasons"

ABNB Host, '23

Highly attractive host incentives for both whole unit rentals and private room rentals will drive supply growth and increase nights booked for ABNB


# 1 Private Room TAM in the US

**Married Population Housing units Bedrooms Occupancy** couples 333,287,557 142,153,010 385,376,810 61,440,000 71% "They are just scratching the **Available** Airbnb's Airbnb's surface for growth" bedrooms (US) listings (US) supply Former Head of Global Growth and **Experiences**, 03/31/2023 4.0% of available supply 113,529,253 2,250,000 4,559,850 in the US


The private room TAM in the US is highly unpenetrated and creates opportunity for higher host adoption

Note: Assumes 2.7 bedrooms per housing unit. Occupancy is calculated by dividing total population less married couples by number of bedrooms. 40% of Airbnb's active listings are private bedrooms and the rest housing units with multiple bedrooms.

# 1 Superior value proposition and differentiated supply drives market share capture from hotels







#### **Commentary**

- "we grew supply by 900,000 listings, or 16% compared to a year ago, representing an acceleration in growth in listings relative to O3"
- "new active hosts recruited with the help of our Superhosts increased by more than 20% compared to prelaunch"
- "Our product improvements are working. Over the past two years, we've made it more attractive and easier to become a host."

Airbnb Earnings Call, Q4'22


- "[low] construction starts over the past couple of years in the U.S. are having an impact in 2023"
- "financing environment for new projects and hotel sales remains challenging, especially here in the U.S., given higher interest rates"
- "construction starts...not back to where we were in 2019"

Marriott Earnings Call, Q4'22

- "construction costs...were still higher than they were in 2019 by about 20% to 30%"
- "but overall in the market, very low levels of supply and that continues to be met with very strong demand"
- "we will have good pricing power, at least through this year, simply because there's no capacity addition really coming into the market"

Hilton Earnings Call, Q4'22


# 1 All-in travel costs further demonstrate ABNB as the superior option



For larger groups Airbnb adds more value to guests than hotels

# 2 Differentiated customer acquisition model drives superior unit economics to other OTA platforms

Illustrative Night Booked	Airbnb	Booking	Expedia
Average daily rate for 2022 (1)	\$160	\$124	\$150
Average take rate for 2022	13.3%	14.1%	12.3%
Total service fees (collected at booking and recognized as revenue upon checkin)	\$21.3	\$17.5	\$18.4
Payment Processing/Chargebacks (2)	\$3.8	\$1.9	\$2.1
Operations & Support	\$2.7	\$0	\$0
Estimated Performance Mktg. Costs (3)	\$0.6	\$6.1	\$8.6
Incremental EBIT per night booked	\$14.2	\$9.5	\$7.7
Incremental Margin	66.7%	54.3%	41.8%




#### ABNB's powerful unit economics drive incremental EBIT margins of 66.7% per average night booked

- 1. Includes car rentals and flights for BKNG. Estimate for EXPE since ADR isn't disclosed
- 2. Includes customer support for BKNG and EXPE. Support is broken out separately for ABNB
- 3. Airbnb benefits from 90% direct traffic, and the estimated total performance marketing is \$230m for FY'22.

Source: ABNB, EXPE, BKNG Company filings.

# 2 Proven track record of improving EBITDA margins through cost discipline





#### EBITDA Margin Drivers

- COGS productivity through reduction of payment costs as a % of revenue
- Leaner operations and support team from a better product
- Reduced product development costs as platform has reached critical mass
- Highly efficient sales and marketing cost management due to 90% direct traffic
- Overall leaner organization driving lower general & administrative costs

#### **ABNB Commentary**

- "During the height of the pandemic, we made some very difficult choices to reduce our spending, making us a leaner and more focused company. And we've kept this discipline ever since"
- "Seeing strong improvements in our variable cost reductions... Everything from community support costs, cost of payments costs, infrastructure costs"
- "90% of our traffic is now direct and sustained that since we went public...We have an extremely high efficiency on things like performance marketing"
- "Over each of the past two years, we've only modestly increased our headcount...compared to 2019, our headcount is actually down 5%, while revenue is up 75%. And every single quarter in 2022 outperformed past comparable periods"
- "We're going to continue to stay really lean, but we're really focused on just really hiring in key positions"


Airbnb, Q4'22


- "I think they'll be disciplined on hiring. So, you put all that into a blender before SBC, and I think you can get north of 40% EBITDA margin"
- "The CFO came from Amazon. He is cost-focused"

Former Airbnb Employee, '23

Platform nature of ABNB's business enables sizeable cost efficiencies and EBITDA margin expansion

# 3 Platform business model creates inherent network effects and a formidable barrier to entry






#### Reinforcing Mechanisms

- 1 Brand familiarity driven by user experience and association of great experiences with ABNB
- Economies of scale and global reach enable lower prices per unit; increasing guest demand in any market ABNB enters
- Best technology stack vs. peers, built by continual feedback loop, enabling:
  - Better matching of guests and hosts through reviews
  - Seamless hosting process and guest user experience
  - Improved price transparency for guests and hosts
  - All algorithms flag risky bookings and personalize the search results to match guests to their perfect properties

ABNB benefits from sustainable global network effects that drive supply and demand

# **SAM and TAM Analysis**

Airbnb has a substantial market opportunity in the growing travel market and experiences economy with estimated SAM and TAM of \$1.4Tn and \$4.0Tn respectively




Note: Market size was estimated using industry market reports and databases as of 2022 (2019 for overnight visitors' calculations). Asia Pacific includes Australasia and excludes China. These numbers correspond to Airbnb's total GBV on which the company collects fees that are recognized as revenues.

# **Competitor Analysis**

Airbnb is the fastest growing OTA and has a much larger and diverse network of listings than its competitors


		OTAs		Hotel	Chains
				noter	
(FY 2022)	(airbnb)	<b>BOOKING</b> HOLDINGS	<b>S</b> Expedia	Marriott International	Hilton
Active listings/rooms	6.6mm	2.7mm	2.9mm	1.5mm	1.1mm
Room nights	394mm	896mm	312mm	356mm	278mm
Gross booking value	\$63,212mm	\$121,253mm	\$95,049mm	\$61,593mm	\$41,946mm
ADR	\$160	\$124	NA	\$173	\$151
Take rate	13.29%	14.09%	12.27%	NA	NA
Revenue CAGR ('17-'22)	27%	6%	3%	-2%	-1%
Direct traffic	91%	55%	NA	NA	NA
Opex-light?	✓	✓	✓	×	×
Adaptable supply model?	✓	×	×	×	×
Unconstrained supply?	✓	×	×	×	×
Organic host/guest adoption?	✓	×	×	×	×

# **Valuation Summary**



Source: Bloomberg, company filings and Team analysis.

# IRR Bridge – Base Case



#### No dividends projected over the life of the investment under the Base Case

Note: Nights includes both nights and experiences booked. Price is calculated by multiplying ADR times take rate. Source: CapitalIQ and Team analysis.

## **Management Team**

Brian Chesky's leadership has resulted in outsized financial performance in recent years

• 2022: 40% revenue growth v-o-v, 49% FCF growth y-o-y, first full profitable year on **GAAP** basis

**Executive management** team and employees have a vested interest in growth of ABNB's share price

- Bulk of management team's compensation is based on stock performance
- Nearly all employee's compensation has a stock component

External hires from Big Tech can bring new perspectives for execution

- · Tara Bunch, GH Ops, Formerly at Apple
- · Jay Carney, GH Comms, formerly at Amazon




Brian Chesky\*, CEO

Co-founder 11.8% ownership / 27.1% voting power Compensation: \$1 / RSUs based on stock price Compensation: \$400K and 50% stock options / hurdles, \$365.0 PT in 2027 (Long-Term Incentive Plan)




Nathan Blecharczyk\*, CSO

Co-founder 9.4% ownership / 23.5% voting power 50% RSUs bonus



Joe Gebbia\*, Chairman Airbnb.org

Co-founder 8.9% ownership / 21.4% voting power





Dave Stephenson, CFO

+4 years with the firm Previous: Amazon, P&G Compensation: \$600K and 50% stock options / 50% RSUs bonus



Ari Balogh, CTO

+4 years with the firm Previous: Google, Yahoo! Compensation: \$600K and 50% stock options / Compensation: \$600K and 50% stock options / 50% RSUs bonus



**Catherine Powell, GH Hosting** 

+3 years with the firm Previous: Disney, BBC 50% RSUs bonus

"I still have half of my net worth in ABNB stock"

Former Head of Global Growth and Experiences, 03/31/2023

Management is well-equipped and incentivized to drive share price outperformance


## **Key Risks and Mitigants**

#### **Risks Mitigants** Airbnb worked with councils to draft regulation favorable to their platform (i.e., London's 90-day cap is below Airbnb's average of 65 nights per property) • NYC allows shared room rentals and long-term stays, which favors Airbnb's mix over Vrbo Regulatory pushback from big dense and Booking.com · Majority of regulations adversely impacts property managers with multiple listings, who cities are more likely to list with Vrbo • Cities that implement short-term rental regulation have reduced Vrbo market share compared to Airbnb (AirDNA) **Increased house-sharing competition** · Airbnb's take rates are in line with other primary competitors (Booking.com 14.1% and Expedia 12.3%) from OTA's could decrease future • With Aircover Insurance and 24/7 support, Airbnb is offering significantly more value **ADRs and margins** than other OTA's Airbnb's current mix is split 50-50 between urban and non-urban High penetration in urban markets Airbnb has opportunities to accelerate growth with long-term stays (21% of nights could deaccelerate future growth booked in '22 vs. 13% in '19) 90% of Airbnb's hosts are individual and 83% of individual hosts will only list on Airbnb Hosts cross-listing properties in (Transparent). Airbnb disclosed that ~72% of listings are exclusive to its platform Airbnb's product improvements (Aircover, pricing tools) further differentiate their competing marketplaces offerings from other apps Disintermediation risk: hosts start • Airbnb offers many features including payments, Aircover (for hosts and guests), and charging guests outside the Airbnb screening services. Discussions on hosting forums show that hosts are generally suspicious of guests going outside the platform platform Work from home trend is here to stay. According to a recent McKinsey study, of 158mm people currently employed, 35% have full remote work, and 23% have partial remote **Reversion to pre-COVID behaviors** work. An expert working at a travel company confirmed continued interest in flexcations, 7+ day stays, and 30+ day stays. Stanford study shows new companies have 81% WFH


# **APPENDIX**

# **Appendix I: Industry Outlook**


## **Industry Tailwinds**








#### **Consumer Share of Wallet (Experiences vs Possessions)**




#### **American Digital Nomad Growth**




# **Appendix II: Valuation**


## **Base Case: Projected Nights Booked**




#### Airbnb's Market Share




#### Nights TAM did not decrease during last recession



#### **Airbnb's Nights Booked**



#### **Base Case: US Market Penetration of Private Rooms TAM**




# 0.4% CAGR 115 114 114 114

**Available Supply in the US** 

#### Airbnb's Listings in the US

(mm)



#### Airbnb's Bedrooms and Penetration in the US

■ Available supply

2025E


2026E

2027E

2024E


2022A


2023E




## **Base Case: Projected Revenues**













# **Base Case: Projected Costs, Gross Profit and Opex**















# Base Case: Projected EBIT, EBITDA, Net Income and UFCF









FCF → %margin

# **Base Case: Valuation Output**

		Base C	ase Unlever	ed Free Ca	sh Flow				
(In US\$ million)	<u>2020A</u>	<u>2021A</u>	<u>2022A</u>	<u>2023E</u>	<u>2024E</u>	<u>2025E</u>	<u>2026E</u>	2027E	<u>CAGR</u>
Revenue	3,378	5,992	8,399	10,572	12,519	14,976	17,713	21,108	20.2%
% Y/Y growth		77.4%	40.2%	25.9%	18.4%	19.6%	18.3%	19.2%	
(-) Cost of revenue	876	1,156	1,499	1,792	2,122	2,546	3,011	3,588	19.1%
Gross Profit	2,502	4,836	6,900	8,780	10,397	12,430	14,702	17,519	20.5%
(-) Total Opex	6,092	4,407	5,098	5,639	6,223	6 <u>,</u> 936	7,730	8,714	11.3%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	102	121	144	171	203	20.2%
EBITDA	(3,464)	567	1,883	3,243	4,294	5,638	7,143	9,009	36.8%
% margin	-102.5%	9.5%	22.4%	30.7%	34.3%	37.7%	40.3%	42.7%	
(-) D&A	126	138	81	102	121	144	171	203	20.2%
EBIT	(3,590)	429	1,802	3,141	4,174	5,494	6,972	8,805	37.3%
% margin	-106.3%	7.2%	21.5%	29.7%	33.3%	36.7%	39.4%	41.7%	
% Effective tax rate	2.7%	12.1%	5.3%	21.7%	22.7%	21.9%	21.7%	21.4%	
(-) Tax	(97)	52	96	682	946	1,202	1,516	1,883	81.4%
NOPAT	(3,493)	377	1,706	2,459	3,227	4,292	5,457	6,922	32.3%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	102	121	144	171	203	20.2%
(-) CAPEX	37	25	25	31	37	45	53	63	20.2%
(-) Change in WC	395	(761)	(319)	(522)	(425)	(550)	(621)	(771)	19.3%
(+) SBC	3,003	899	930	1,128	1,245	1,387	1,546	1,743	13.4%
(+) Other	164	562	232	-	-	-	-	-	-100.0%
FCF (Unlevered)	(632)	2,713	3,243	4,179	4,980	6,329	7,742	9,576	24.2%
OCF - Capex + Interest	(632)	2,713	3,243	4,179	4,980	6,329	7,742	9,576	24.2%
FCF Multiple		35.5x	21.9x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	
EV		96,200	70,905	83,586	99,598	126,584	154,845	191,517	
Minus: Net Debt		6,340	7,635	12,083	<u>17,621</u>	24,468	32,815	43,002	
Market Cap		102,540	78,540	95,669	117,219	151,052	187,660	234,520	
Shares outstanding		616	680	689	699	709	718	728	
Target Share Price		\$166.5	\$115.5	\$138.8	\$167.7	\$213.2	\$261.3	\$322.0	
Current Share Drice	Ć11E E								

Market share: 9.9% Nights: 983.2 ADR: \$158.1 Take rate: 13.6%

~17% of revenue

Increase in Opex as % of increase in revenue: ~30%

~20% of Opex

Share count growing with share-based count

Current Share Price \$115.5 5 Year Target Price \$322.0 Upside 178.8% 5 Year IRR 22.8% MOIC 2.79x

# **Bear Case: Valuation Output**

		Bear C	ase Unlever	ed Free Cas	h Flow				
(In US\$ million)	<u>2020A</u>	2021A	2022A	2023E	2024E	2025E	2026E	2027E	CAGR
Revenue	3,378	5,992	8,399	9,471	9,920	10,378	10,863	11,399	6.3%
% Y/Y growth		77.4%	40.2%	12.8%	4.7%	4.6%	4.7%	4.9%	
(-) Cost of revenue	876	1,156	1,499	1,678	1,758	1,868	1,955	2,052	6.5%
Gross Profit	2,502	4,836	6,900	7,793	8,163	8,510	8,908	9,347	6.3%
(-) Total Opex	6,092	4,407	5,098	5,416	5,587	5 <u>,</u> 761	5,945	6,149	3.8%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	91	96	100	105	110	6.3%
EBITDA	(3,464)	567	1,883	2,468	2,671	2,849	3,067	3,308	11.9%
% margin	-102.5%	9.5%	22.4%	26.1%	26.9%	27.5%	28.2%	29.0%	
(-) D&A	126	138	81	91	96	100	105	110	6.3%
EBIT	(3,590)	429	1,802	2,376	2,576	2,749	2,962	3,198	12.2%
% margin	-106.3%	7.2%	21.5%	25.1%	26.0%	26.5%	27.3%	28.1%	
% Effective tax rate	2.7%	12.1%	5.3%	22.1%	23.8%	23.2%	23.1%	22.6%	
<u>(-)</u> Tax	(97)	52	96	526	613	637	685	722	49.7%
NOPAT	(3,493)	377	1,706	1,850	1,963	2,112	2,277	2,476	7.7%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	91	96	100	105	110	6.3%
(-) CAPEX	37	25	25	28	30	31	32	34	6.3%
(-) Change in WC	395	(761)	(319)	(349)	(88)	(64)	(123)	(136)	-15.7%
(+) SBC	3,003	899	930	1,083	1,117	1,152	1,189	1,230	5.7%
(+) Other	164	562	232	-	-	-	-	_	-100.0%
FCF (Unlevered)	(632)	2,713	3,243	3,346	3,234	3,398	3,662	3,918	3.9%
OCF - Capex + Interest	(632)	2,713	3,243	3,346	3,234	3,398	3,662	3,918	3.9%
FCF Multiple		35.5x	21.9x	15.0x	15.0x	15.0x	15.0x	14.0x	
EV		96,200	70,905	50,183	48,511	50,965	54,930	54,848	
Minus: Net Debt		6,340	7,635	11,235	14,958	18,793	22,918	27,250	
Market Cap		102,540	78,540	61,419	63,469	69,758	77,849	82,098	
Shares outstanding		616	680	689	698	706	713	720	
Target Share Price		\$166.5	\$115.5	\$89.1	\$91.0	\$98.9	\$109.2	\$114.0	

Market share: 6.4% Nights: 634.5 ADR: \$142.6 Take rate: 12.6%

~18% of revenue

Increase in Opex as % of increase in revenue: ~38%

~20% of Opex

Share count growing with share-based count

Current Share Price \$115.5
5 Year Target Price \$114.0
Upside -1.3%
5 Year IRR -0.3%
MOIC 0.99x

# **Bull Case: Valuation Output**

		Bull Ca	se Unlever	ed Free Cas	h Flow				
(In US\$ million)	<u>2020A</u>	<u>2021A</u>	2022A	2023E	2024E	2025E	2026E	2027E	<u>CAGR</u>
Revenue	3,378	5,992	8,399	11,266	14,430	18,089	23,064	30,299	29.3%
% Y/Y growth		77.4%	40.2%	34.1%	28.1%	25.4%	27.5%	31.4%	
(-) Cost of revenue	876	1,156	1,499	1,911	2,448	3,075	3,921	5,151	28.0%
Gross Profit	2,502	4,836	6,900	9,355	11,982	15,014	19,143	25,148	29.5%
(-) Total Opex	6,092	4,407	5,098	5,812	6,666	7,617	8,811	10,548	15.7%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	109	139	175	223	293	29.3%
EBITDA	(3,464)	567	1,883	3,652	5,456	7,571	10,554	14,893	51.2%
% margin	-102.5%	9.5%	22.4%	32.4%	37.8%	41.9%	45.8%	49.2%	
(-) D&A	126	138	81	109	139	175	223	293	29.3%
EBIT	(3,590)	429	1,802	3,543	5,316	7,396	10,332	14,600	52.0%
% margin	-106.3%	7.2%	21.5%	31.4%	36.8%	40.9%	44.8%	48.2%	
% Effective tax rate	2.7%	12.1%	5.3%	21.6%	22.3%	21.5%	21.4%	21.0%	
(-) Tax	(97)	52	96	764	1,184	1,593	2,206	3,071	100.0%
NOPAT	(3,493)	377	1,706	2,779	4,132	5,803	8,125	11,529	46.5%
(+) D&A	126	138	81	109	139	175	223	293	29.3%
(-) CAPEX	37	25	25	34	43	54	69	90	29.3%
(-) Change in WC	395	(761)	(319)	(659)	(663)	(815)	(1,055)	(1,534)	36.9%
(+) SBC	3,003	899	930	1,162	1,333	1,523	1,762	2,110	17.8%
(+) Other	164	562	232	-	-	-	=	-	-100.0%
FCF (Unlevered)	(632)	2,713	3,243	4,676	6,225	8,262	11,096	15,375	36.5%
OCF - Capex + Interest	(632)	2,713	3,243	4,676	6,225	8,262	11,096	15,375	36.5%
FCF Multiple		35.5x	21.9x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	20.0x	
EV		96,200	70,905	93,513	124,501	165,249	221,927	307,497	
Minus: Net Debt		6,340	7,635	12,587	19,418	28,251	40,047	56,178	
Market Cap		102,540	78,540	106,101	143,918	193,500	261,974	363,675	
Shares outstanding		616	680	690	700	710	722	734	
Target Share Price		\$166.5	\$115.5	\$153.8	\$205.6	\$272.4	\$363.1	\$495.7	
Current Share Price	\$115.5								

Market share: 12.3% Nights: 1,222.4 ADR: \$177.1 Take rate: 14.0%

~17% of revenue

Increase in Opex as % of increase in revenue: ~25%

~20% of Opex

Share count growing with share-based count

Current Share Price \$115.5
5 Year Target Price \$495.7
Upside 329.2%
5 Year IRR 33.8%
MOIC 4.29x

# **Base Case: Sensitivity Analysis**

	Sensitivity to 2027E Nights Booked and ADRs												
IRR													
(%)	Market sh	are (%):	5.8%	6.9%	7.7%	9.9%	10.4%	12.3%	14.3%				
Nights booked (mm):		576.4	692.9	767.3	983.2	1,036.1	1,222.4	1,422.1					
		\$123.4	2.4%	7.1%	9.8%	16.1%	17.6%	22.1%	26.2%				
		\$138.1	5.6%	10.2%	12.9%	19.1%	20.5%	24.9%	28.9%				
		\$150.1	7.9%	12.4%	15.1%	21.3%	22.7%	27.0%	31.0%				
	ADRs (US\$)	\$158.1	9.4%	13.9%	16.5%	22.8%	24.1%	28.3%	32.2%				
	(==1,	\$163.3	10.3%	14.7%	17.4%	23.7%	25.0%	29.3%	33.2%				
		\$179.9	13.1%	17.5%	20.2%	26.4%	27.8%	32.1%	36.1%				
		\$193.1	15.0%	19.5%	22.1%	28.4%	29.8%	34.2%	38.2%				

2022A:

Nights booked: 394.0mm

Market share: 6.8%

ADRs: \$160.4

Base Case 2027E:

Nights booked: 983.2mm

Market share: 9.9%

ADRs: \$158.1


Positively skewed returns profile with downside protection

# **Public Comparables (Current LTM Multiples)**

							LTM			
Company Name M	Market Cap	Enterprise Value	Revenues	EBITDA	Net Income	FCF	EV / Revenues	EV / EBITDA	EV / FCF	P/E
(In US\$ million) OTAs										ı
Booking Holdings Expedia Group MakeMyTrip Despegar.com Mean Median	107,628 15,172 2,531 451	107,717 18,713 2,259 233	17,090 11,667 533 517	5,553 1,877 27 31	3,058 352 -21 -66	6,320 2,916 12 67	6.3x 1.6x 4.2x 0.5x <b>3.1x</b>	19.4x 10.0x 83.0x 7.6x <b>30.0x</b>	17.0x 6.4x 186.0x 3.5x <b>53.2x</b>	35.2x 43.1x NA NA 39.1x
	2						2.9x	14.7x	11.7x	39.1x
Listing and Meta S										<u> </u>
Tripadvisor	2,624	2,439	1,492	198	20	353	1.6x	12.3x	6.9x	131.2x
Hotel Chains										
Marriott	56,823	66,241	20,773	3,655	2,358	2,316	3.2x	18.1x	28.6x	24.1x
Hilton	41,002	48,380	8,773	2,256	1,257	1,943	5.5x	21.4x	24.9x	32.6x
Mean Median							4.4x 4.4x	19.8x 19.8x	26.7x 26.7x	28.4x 28.4x
<b>Property Manager</b>	nent Companie	es								 
Vacasa	168	317	1,162	-105	-148	-60	0.3x	NA	NA	NA
Sonder Holdings	111	38	461	-256	-151	-156	0.1x	NA	NA	NA
Mean							0.2x	NA	NA	NA
Median							0.2x	NA	NA	I NA
Airbnb	78,540	70,905	8,399	1,883	1,893	3,243	8.4x	37.7x	21.9x	41.5x
All peer groups										l L
Mean Median							2.6x 1.6x	24.5x 18.1x	39.1x 17.0x	53.2x 35.2x

Airbnb is currently trading at a ~28% premium to peer group median EV / FCF LTM

# **Public Comparables (Through-the-cycle LTM Multiples)**




Airbnb's Exit Multiple under the Base Case scenario is in line with the peer group EV / FCF LTM Through-the-cycle median

# **Appendix III: Business Model**

## **Supply and Demand Dynamics**




(\$)



#### **Demand Drivers**

- 1 Superior value in comparison to the average hotel
- 2 One-of-a-kind spaces that are unavailable through hotel platforms
- 3 Feel at home, with amenities not provided at a hotel
- 4 Travel like a local through host recommendations
- 5 Authentic experiences hosted by hosts through ABNB Experiences

#### **Historical Active Listings**




#### **Supply Drivers**

- 1 Hosts earn extra income on otherwise unused property
- 2 Connecting with guests and showing them the local community
- 3 Share skills and passions with guests through ABNB Experiences
- Reducing barriers to hosting through product, referrals, and mentorship

Uniquely positioned to capture outsized travel demand through rapid listings growth

## **Illustrative Nights Booked and Customer Acquisition**

ABNB Illustrative Night Booked					
Host:					
Price per night set by host	\$100				
Less: Host fees (illustrative)	\$3				
Total paid to host	\$97				
Guest:					
Price per night set by host	\$100				
Guest fees (illustrative)	\$12				
Lodging taxes (pass through and remitted to local	\$4				
authorities; illustrative)	, <del>4</del>				
Total collected from guest (GBV)	\$116				
Airbnb:					
Total service fees (collected at booking and	\$15				
recognized as revenue upon check-in)	713				
2022 FCF Conversion Percentage	40.0%				
ABNB Night Booked FCF (illustrative)	\$6				



"Supply acquisition is organic – outside of some marketing campaigns and product improvements, they have to do very little to bring more hosts onto the platform."

Former Head of Global Growth and Experiences, 03/31/2023

The platform nature of ABNB's business allows for superior FCF generation with an asset light business model


## **ABNB vs Hotels Value Proposition**



For each city that we checked, Airbnb provided a better value proposition (same dates and location)

# Appendix IV: Product Overview

## **ABNB User Experience vs Peers**



ABNB's offers a far superior search user experience that inspires unique trips while balancing demand and supply

## **Airbnb Product Upgrades - 2021**


#### **Summer 2021**

#### Flexibility designed for the new world of travel



Flexible destinations






Flexible matching A new way for guests to discover unique stays they might Includes listings that lie just outside a specified search, to Guests can now search for new options, from a weekend

getaway to stays for a month or more.

#### Summer 2021 Release brought 100+ upgrades including:

- "I'm Flexible" feature allowed for flexible destinations, flexible dates, and flexible search (showing properties "just outside" search
- Guest experience simplified with arrival guides, curated wish lists, and faster checkout processes
- Hosting page simplified to "become a Host in 10 Steps"

#### Winter 2021



#### Winter 2021 Release brought 50+ upgrades including:

- AirCover provides hosts \$1 MM liability insurance, \$1 MM damage protection, 14-day filing window, and fast tracking Superhosts
- New host features such as "suggest price range", "what's my place worth", and "intro to hosting" classes
- New guest features such as "seasonally-aware filters", "Detailed amenities", "Trip planning ideas"

## **Airbnb Product Upgrades - 2022**

#### **Summer 2022**

Designed to help guests discover one-of-a-kind homes

Our Hosts offer millions of unique homes around the world. Airbnb Categories organize them into curated collections, with over 50 categories of homes chosen for their style, location, or nearby activities. They include:







Design Historical homes

OMG!

#### **Summer 2022 Release upgrades include:**

- "Categories" feature allowing Guests to search for specific categories such as "Design", and "OMG!", allowing guests flexibility to plan the dates and location based on properties they find appealing
- AirCover for Guests includes Booking Protection, "Check-in Guarantee", "Get-What-You-Booked" Guarantee, and 24hr support

#### Winter 2022



	Airbnb	Competitor
Guest identity verification	~	~
Reservation screening	~	×
\$3M damage protection	~	×
Art & valuables	~	×
Auto & boat	~	×
Pet damage	~	×
Income loss	~	×
Deep cleaning	~	×
\$1M liability insurance	~	~
24-hour safety line	~	×

#### Winter 2022 Release upgrades include:

- Aircover increased host damage protection to \$3m, added guest identity verification, reservation screening, and 24-hour safety line
- Airbnb Setup, which streamlines the host signup process with simplified steps, mentoring from Superhosts, and specialized support
- Additional host features such as "detailed reviews", "Fast Pay", "New Category Controls", and Easier claims processes
- More "Categories" added to the platform, enhancing Guest search

# **Appendix V: ABNB Property IRRs**

## **Host Unit Economics – NYC Super Host Data**

#### **Super Host Projections**

DEDAGTED												
REDACTED	Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Exit	TOTAL
REVENUES	413,400	454,740	482,024	510,946	541,603	574,099	608,545	645,057	683,761	724,786		
EXPENSES	(158,492)	(171,928)	(181,179)	(190,952)	(201,279)	(212,192)	(223,725)	(235,913)	(248,796)	(262,414)		
Taxes	6,180	6,365	6,556	6,753	6,956	7,164	7,379	7,601	7,829	8,063		
Insurance	4,944	5,092	5,245	5,402	5,565	5,731	5,903	6,080	6,263	6,451		
W&S	6,180	6,365	6,556	6,753	6,956	7,164	7,379	7,601	7,829	8,063		
Maint, Mgmt	124,020	136,422	144,607	153,284	162,481	172,230	182,563	193,517	205,128	217,436		
Utilities	13,596	14,004	14,424	14,857	15,302	15,761	16,234	16,721	17,223	17,740		
Other	3,572	3,679	3,790	3,903	4,020	4,141	4,265	4,393	4,525	4,661		
NOI	254,908	282,812	300,846	319,994	340,323	361,907	384,820	409,144	434,964	462,372		
Debt Service	(98,309)	(98,309)	(98,309)	(98,309)	(98,309)	(133,821)	(133,821)	(133,821)	(133,821)	(133,821)		
CF	156,599	184,503	202,537	221,685	242,015	228,085	250,999	275,323	301,143	328,551	2,323,776	
Investor CF	109,620	129,152	141,776	155,180	421,891	159,660	175,699	192,726	210,800	229,986	1,626,643	3,553,132
Return	15.05%	17.73%	19.47%	21.31%	57.93%	21.92%	24.13%	26.46%	28.95%	31.58%		4.88x
All-In (728,246)												

Super Host with six years of experience solely doing ABNB rentals in NYC has kindly provided us with their returns model representing 25.6% IRR and 4.9x MOIC

REDACTED	*7.4	***	*7.0	77.4	37.5	** *		***	** 0	¥7.40		
NEDACIED	Yr1	Yr2	Yr3	Yr4	Yr5	Yr6	Yr7	Yr8	Yr9	Yr10	Exit	TOTAL
REVENUES	97,000	100,395	103,909	107,546	111,310	115,206	119,238	123,411	127,730	132,201		
EXPENSES	(39,472)	(40,507)	(41,573)	(42,672)	(43,803)	(44,968)	(46,167)	(47,403)	(48,676)	(49,987)		
Taxes	6,180	6,365	6,556	6,753	6,956	7,164	7,379	7,601	7,829	8,063		
Insurance	4,944	5,092	5,245	5,402	5,565	5,731	5,903	6,080	6,263	6,451		
W&S	6,180	6,365	6,556	6,753	6,956	7,164	7,379	7,601	7,829	8,063		
Maint, Mgmt	5,000	5,001	5,002	5,003	5,004	5,005	5,006	5,007	5,008	5,009		
Utilities	13,596	14,004	14,424	14,857	15,302	15,761	16,234	16,721	17,223	17,740		
Other	3,572	3,679	3,790	3,903	4,020	4,141	4,265	4,393	4,525	4,661		
NOI	57,528	59,888	62,335	64,874	67,507	70,238	73,070	76,008	79,054	82,214		
Debt Service	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)	(53,592)		
CF	3,936	6,295	8,743	11,282	13,915	16,646	19,478	22,415	25,462	28,621	2,652,761	2,809,554
Return	0.30%	0.48%	0.66%	0.86%	1.06%	1.26%	1.48%	1.70%	1.93%	2.17%		
All-in (1,318,742)												
IRR 7.31%												
Mult 2.13x												

<sup>&</sup>quot;Investors are often surprised when we show them our IRR's, but rentals is truly an amazing business as people always come to NYC"

ABNB New York Super Host, '23

Even in a highly competitive market such as New York, the returns from hosting are immense

IRR 25.61%

## **Host Unit Economics – NYC ABNB Rental Property Purchase**

#### **NYC Purchase IRR Analysis**



#### **Entry / Exit Assumptions**

Entry Price: \$1mm Exit Cap Rate: 5.2% Holding Period: 5 years

#### **Operating Assumptions**

Occupancy: 90.0% ADR: \$300.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 20.0%

#### **Financing Assumptions**

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 6.5%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(1,000,000)					1,398,462
Debt	800,000					(800,000)
Closing Costs	(40,000)					(111,877)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		98,550	98,550	98,550	98,550	98,550
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(2,957)	(2,957)	(2,957)	(2,957)	(2,957)
Utilities and Maintenance		(4,800)	(4,872)	(4,945)	(5,019)	(5,095)
Cleaning Costs		(4,693)	(4,763)	(4,835)	(4,907)	(4,981)
Furniture and Furnishings	(4,000)					
NOI	(4,000)	86,101	85,958	85,814	85,667	85,518
Property ownership tax		(2,000)	(2,000)	(2,000)	(2,000)	(2,000)
Income Tax		(19,710)	(19,710)	(19,710)	(19,710)	(19,710)
Interest		(65,000)	(65,000)	(65,000)	(65,000)	(65,000)
Post Tax NOI	(4,000)	(609)	(752)	(896)	(1,043)	(1,192)
FCF	(244,000)	(609)	(752)	(896)	(1,043)	485,393

IRR	14.5%
MOIC	1.96

Team analysis has found IRRs to be lower given higher interest rates but are still lucrative

## **Host Unit Economics – NYC ABNB Rental Property Lease**

#### **NYC Lease IRR Analysis**



0	1	2	3	4	5
	97,200	97,200	97,200	97,200	97,200
(9,790)					
	(53,845)	(60,502)	(62,317)	(64,187)	(60,603)
	(2,916)	(2,916)	(2,916)	(2,916)	(2,916)
	(4,800)	(4,872)	(4,945)	(5,019)	(5,095)
	(4,693)	(4,763)	(4,835)	(4,907)	(4,981)
(4,000)					
	(19,440)	(19,440)	(19,440)	(19,440)	(19,440)
(13,790)	11,506	4,707	2,747	731	4,166
	(9,790)	97,200 (9,790) (53,845) (2,916) (4,800) (4,693) (4,000)	97,200 97,200  (9,790)  (53,845) (60,502) (2,916) (2,916) (4,800) (4,872) (4,693) (4,763)  (4,000)  (19,440) (19,440)	97,200 97,200 97,200  (9,790)  (53,845) (60,502) (62,317) (2,916) (2,916) (2,916) (4,800) (4,872) (4,945) (4,693) (4,763) (4,835)  (4,000)  (19,440) (19,440) (19,440)	97,200 97,200 97,200 97,200  (9,790)  (53,845) (60,502) (62,317) (64,187) (2,916) (2,916) (2,916) (2,916) (4,800) (4,872) (4,945) (5,019) (4,693) (4,763) (4,835) (4,907) (4,000)  (19,440) (19,440) (19,440) (19,440)

IRR	32.6%
MOIC	1.73

## Operating Assumptions Revenue

Occupancy: 90.0%

ADR: \$300.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0%

#### **OPEX**

Rent: \$4,895

Annual Rent Growth: 3.0%

OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 20.0%


"In urban locations, the majority of ABNB hosts conduct rent arbitrage and the returns from these operations are much more lucrative than purchasing the property. **Anyone can do it you don't need to be a millionaire**"

ABNB New York Super Host, '23


Leasing the property to be rented out on ABNB provides much greater returns and little to no capital requirements

## **Host Unit Economics – Dallas Private Room Opportunity**


#### **Private Room Projections**



#### 2 Bedroom



#### 3 Bedroom



Private Room Opportunity Analysis	
Revenue	
Private Room Annual Nights Booked	100
Private Room ADR	80
Private Room Annual Revenue	8,000
Incremental Cost	
2 Bedroom Monthly Cost	4,466
3 Bedroom Monthly Cost	4,616
3 Bedroom Incremental Monthly Cost	(150)
3 Bedroom Incremental Annual Cost	(1,800)

"ABNB has helped us pay off our mortgage and generate additional income from our extra room during high seasons"

**Private Room Cash Flow** 

ABNB Host, '23

6,200

Private room rentals are highly beneficial for existing property owners to ease mortgage payments

## **Host Unit Economics – Fairbanks, Alaska**

#### Fairbanks, Alaska Purchase IRR Analysis



**Entry / Exit Assumptions\*** 

Entry Price: \$148K Exit Cap Rate: 7.7% Holding Period: 5 years

**Operating Assumptions\*** 

Occupancy: 65.0%

ADR: \$198.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 20.0%

**Financing Assumptions** 

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 6.5%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(148,000)					233,766
Debt	118,400					(118,400)
Closing Costs	(5,920)					(18,701)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		46,976	46,976	46,976	46,976	46,976
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(1,409)	(1,409)	(1,409)	(1,409)	(1,409)
Utilities and Maintenance		(4,800)	(4,872)	(4,945)	(5,019)	(5,095)
Cleaning Costs		(7,908)	(8,027)	(8,147)	(8,270)	(8,394)
Furniture and Furnishings	(15,000)					
NOI	(15,000)	32,858	32,667	32,474	32,277	32,078
Property ownership tax		(1,480)	(1,480)	(1,480)	(1,480)	(1,480)
Income Tax		(9,395)	(9,395)	(9,395)	(9,395)	(9,395)
Interest		(9,620)	(9,620)	(9,620)	(9,620)	(9,620)
Post Tax NOI	(15,000)	12,363	12,172	11,979	11,782	11,583
FCF	(50,520)	12,363	12,172	11,979	11,782	108,248

IRR	33.4%
MOIC	3.10

Returns are in line for less competitive yet attractive tourist markets throughout the U.S. using very conservative assumptions

## **Host Unit Economics – New Haven, Connecticut**

#### **New Haven, Connecticut Purchase IRR Analysis**



Entry / Exit Assumptions\*

Entry Price: \$261K Exit Cap Rate: 5.8% Holding Period: 5 years

#### **Operating Assumptions\***

Occupancy: 63.0%

ADR: \$207.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 20.0%

#### **Financing Assumptions**

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 6.5%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(261,000)					455,172
Debt	208,800					(208,800)
Closing Costs	(10,440)					(36,414)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		47,600	47,600	47,600	47,600	47,600
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(1,428)	(1,428)	(1,428)	(1,428)	(1,428)
Utilities and Maintenance		(4,800)	(4,872)	(4,945)	(5,019)	(5,095)
Cleaning Costs		(7,665)	(7,780)	(7,897)	(8,015)	(8,135)
Furniture and Furnishings	(15,000)					
NOI	(15,000)	33,707	33,520	33,330	33,137	32,942
Property ownership tax		(2,610)	(2,610)	(2,610)	(2,610)	(2,610)
Income Tax		(9,520)	(9,520)	(9,520)	(9,520)	(9,520)
Interest		(16,965)	(16,965)	(16,965)	(16,965)	(16,965)
Post Tax NOI	(15,000)	4,612	4,425	4,235	4,042	3,847
FCF	(77,640)	4,612	4,425	4,235	4,042	213,805

IRR	25.9%
MOIC	2.98

Returns are in line for less competitive yet attractive tourist markets throughout the U.S. using very conservative assumptions

## **Host Unit Economics – Evansville, Indiana**

#### **Evansville, Indiana Purchase IRR Analysis**



Entry / Exit Assumptions\*

Entry Price: \$116K Exit Cap Rate: 7.4% Holding Period: 5 years

#### **Operating Assumptions\***

Occupancy: 61.0% ADR: \$129.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 20.0%

#### **Financing Assumptions**

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 6.5%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(116,000)					227,642
Debt	92,800					(92,800)
Closing Costs	(4,640)					(18,211)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		28,722	28,722	28,722	28,722	28,722
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(862)	(862)	(862)	(862)	(862)
Utilities and Maintenance		(4,800)	(4,872)	(4,945)	(5,019)	(5,095)
Cleaning Costs		(7,422)	(7,533)	(7,646)	(7,761)	(7,877)
Furniture and Furnishings	(15,000)					
NOI	(15,000)	15,639	15,455	15,269	15,080	14,889
Property ownership tax		(1,160)	(1,160)	(1,160)	(1,160)	(1,160)
Income Tax		(5,744)	(5,744)	(5,744)	(5,744)	(5,744)
Interest		(7,540)	(7,540)	(7,540)	(7,540)	(7,540)
Post Tax NOI	(15,000)	1,194	1,011	825	636	444
FCF	(42,840)	1,194	1,011	825	636	117,075

23.6%

2.82

Returns are in line for less competitive yet attractive tourist markets throughout the U.S. using very conservative assumptions

IRR

MOIC

## Host Unit Economics – Lima, Peru

#### Lima, Peru Purchase IRR Analysis



#### **Entry / Exit Assumptions**

Entry Price: \$100K Exit Cap Rate: 8.5% Holding Period: 5 years

#### **Operating Assumptions**

Occupancy: 80.0%

ADR: \$50.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 30.0%

#### **Financing Assumptions**

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 9.0%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(100,000)					141,176
Debt	80,000					(80,000)
Closing Costs	(3,100)					(7,059)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		14,600	14,600	14,600	14,600	14,600
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(438)	(438)	(438)	(438)	(438)
Utilities and Maintenance		(420)	(426)	(433)	(439)	(446)
Cleaning Costs		(487)	(494)	(501)	(509)	(517)
Furniture and Furnishings	(1,800)					
NOI	(1,800)	13,255	13,242	13,228	13,214	13,200
Property ownership tax		(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)
Income Tax		(4,380)	(4,380)	(4,380)	(4,380)	(4,380)
Interest		(7,200)	(7,200)	(7,200)	(7,200)	(7,200)
Post Tax NOI	(1,800)	1,575	1,562	1,548	1,534	1,520
FCF	(24,900)	1,575	1,562	1,548	1,534	55,637

IRR	21.5%
MOIC	2.48

Select LATAM markets are highly attractive for hosts generating upwards of 20.0% IRR despite much higher interest rates and taxes

## Host Unit Economics – Jakarta, Indonesia

#### Jakarta, Indonesia Purchase IRR Analysis



#### **Entry / Exit Assumptions**

Entry Price: \$110K Exit Cap Rate: 5.5% Holding Period: 5 years

#### **Operating Assumptions**

Occupancy: 65.0%

ADR: \$80.0

ABNB Rent Growth: 0.0% OPEX Growth: 1.5% Income Tax: 25.0%

#### **Financing Assumptions**

LTV: 80.0%

Interest Rate: 6.9%

Year	0	1	2	3	4	5
Purchase / Exit CFs						
Entry / Exit Price	(110,000)					163,636
Debt	88,000					(88,000)
Closing Costs	(3,410)					(8,182)
Revenue						
ABNB Rent		18,980	18,980	18,980	18,980	18,980
OPEX						
ABNB Fees		(569)	(569)	(569)	(569)	(569)
Utilities and Maintenance		(1,200)	(1,218)	(1,236)	(1,255)	(1,274)
Cleaning Costs		(1,582)	(1,605)	(1,629)	(1,654)	(1,679)
Furniture and Furnishings	(3,500)					
NOI	(3,500)	15,629	15,587	15,545	15,502	15,458
Property ownership tax		(110)	(110)	(110)	(110)	(110)
Income Tax		(4,745)	(4,745)	(4,745)	(4,745)	(4,745)
Interest		(6,054)	(6,054)	(6,054)	(6,054)	(6,054)
Post Tax NOI	(3,500)	4,720	4,678	4,635	4,592	4,549
FCF	(28,910)	4,720	4,678	4,635	4,592	72,003

IRR	30.7%
MOIC	3.13

Select APAC markets are highly attractive for hosts generating upwards of 20.0% IRR despite lower ADRs and higher taxes

## **Appendix VI: Competitors**

## **Competitive Landscape**

Airbnb competes for hosts and guests that have a wide vary of options to find and book accommodations and experiences

Online Travel Agencies	Internet Search Engines	Listing and Meta Search Websites	Hotel Chains	Property Management Companies	Online Platforms offering Experiences
Expedia Trip.com  Expedia  Expedia  Trip.com  Expedia  Expedia  Trip.com  Expedia  Expedia  Trip.com  Expedia  Expedia  Meituan Dianping  Indianping  Indianping	Google Bai 都首度	Tripadvisor  () trivago  □ 马蜂窝  I AllTheRooms.  home to go_  cholidu  craigslist	HILON  HILON  ACCOR  WYNDHAM  HOTELS & RESORTS  INTERCONTINENTAL®  HOTELS & RESORTS  WYNDHAM  HOTELS & RESORTS	vacasa  Sonder  INSPIRATO  COLVE  awaze	TUI MUSEMENT  KIOOK  TUI MUSEMENT  KKOOY

## **Peer Benchmarking**


# Airbnb differentiates from its peers by offering unique available listings, large guest booking volume, personalization of search results, safety and community support


	Company	Description	Operating Metrics (2022)	Financials (2022)
		Airbnb offers private rooms, primary homes, vacation homes and experiences to guests in the US (46% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Active listings: 6.6mm</li> <li>Nights and exp.: 394mm</li> <li>GBV: \$63,212mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$160</li> <li>Take rate: 13.29%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$8,339mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: 27%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 18%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 22%</li> <li>% ROIC: 23%</li> </ul>
	BOOKING agoda HOLDINGS  Rentalcars.com OpenTable	Booking offers air ticketing, online accommodation, car rentals, restaurant reservations and services in Europe (79% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Active listings: 2.7mm</li> <li>Room nights: 896mm</li> <li>GBV: \$121,253mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$124</li> <li>Take rate: 14.09%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$17,090mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: 6%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 46%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 32%</li> <li>% ROIC: 26%</li> </ul>
OTAs	Hotels.com  HomeAway  Expedia  RBITZ  ** travelocity	Expedia offers air ticketing, online accommodation reservations, car rentals and services in the US (68% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Active listings: 2.9mm</li> <li>Room nights: 312mm</li> <li>GBV: \$95,049mm</li> <li>ADRs: NA</li> <li>Take rate: 12.27%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$11,667mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: 3%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 52%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 16%</li> <li>% ROIC: 7%</li> </ul>
	make <i>wy</i> trip	MakeMyTrip offers air ticketing, hotels and packages, bus tickets, car rentals, experiences and services in India (98% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Active listings: 0.8mm</li> <li>Room nights: 70mm</li> <li>GBV: \$5,905mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$33</li> <li>Take rate: 9.03%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$533mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: -4%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 17%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 5%</li> <li>% ROIC: 1%</li> </ul>
	despegar	Despegar offers air ticketing, online accommodation reservations, car rentals, bus tickets and services in Latin America	<ul> <li>Active listings: 0.5mm</li> <li>Transactions: 8.6mm</li> <li>GBV: \$3,974mm</li> <li>GBV/transaction: \$460</li> <li>Take rate: 13.01%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$517mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: 0%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 29%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 6%</li> <li>% ROIC: -4%</li> </ul>


## Peer Benchmarking (cont.)


	Company	Description	Operating Metrics (2022)	Financials (2022)
Listing and Meta Search Websites	Tripadvisor  viator.  thefork  a TripAdvisor company	Tripadvisor offers experiences, restaurant reservations and travel guidance platforms to generate authentic ratings and reviews in the US (61% of sales) and overseas	Tripadvisor     Ratings & reviews: +1bn     Experiences: 8mm Viator     Operators: +50K     Experiences: +300K	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$1,492mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: -1%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 53%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 13%</li> <li>% ROIC: 2%</li> </ul>
Hotel Chains	<b>Xarrioff</b> INTERNATIONAL	Marriott operates, franchises, and licenses hotel, residential, timeshare, and other lodging properties in US & Canada (76% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Properties: 8.3K</li> <li>Rooms: 1.5mm</li> <li>Room nights: 356mm</li> <li>GBV: \$61,593mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$173</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$20,773mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: -2%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: N.A.</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 18%</li> <li>% ROIC: 25%</li> </ul>
	Hilton	Hilton engages in managing, franchising, owning, and leasing hotels and resorts in the US (79% of sales) and overseas	<ul> <li>Properties: 7.2K</li> <li>Rooms: 1.1mm</li> <li>Room nights: 278mm</li> <li>GBV: \$41,946mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$151</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$8,773mm</li> <li>Growth '17-'22: -1%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: N.A.</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: 26%</li> <li>% ROIC: 20%</li> </ul>
Property Management	(A) Vacasa	Vacasa operates a vacation rental management platform in North America, Belize, and Costa Rica	<ul> <li>Properties: 37.0K</li> <li>Room nights: 6.1mm</li> <li>GBV: \$2,519mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$410</li> <li>Take rate: 46.13%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$1,162mm</li> <li>Growth '19-'22: 31%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 23%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: N.A.</li> <li>% ROIC: N.A.</li> </ul>
Companies	∑ Sonder	Sonder operates a vacation rental management platform in North America, Europe, and the Middle East	<ul> <li>Properties: 17.6K</li> <li>Room nights: 2.5mm</li> <li>GBV: \$461mm</li> <li>ADRs: \$187</li> <li>Take rate: 99.96%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Revenue: \$461mm</li> <li>Growth '19-'22: 26%</li> <li>% Sales and mkt.: 11%</li> <li>% EBITDA margin: N.A.</li> <li>% ROIC: N.A.</li> </ul>

## **ABNB Market Share by Region**









Source: Euromonitor.
(1) Includes China and Australasia.

# **Appendix VII: Regulation**

## **Regulatory Outlook**

City	Regulation	Our Take
New York	<ul> <li>Hosts required to register with city of New York for short-term rentals (below 30 days)</li> <li>Host must be present in the property for short-term rentals (only private rooms allowed), and guest must have unobstructed access to all areas</li> <li>Long-term rentals (above 30 days) on Airbnb platform are exempt from the above two requirements</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Airbnb is the only large house-sharing provider that offers private rooms inside a residence. This has been exempted from regulation and benefits Airbnb versus other competitors</li> <li>Exemptions for Long-term furnished rentals benefit Airbnb compared to Vrbo and other alternative accommodation providers</li> <li>Biggest risk is restrictions on full property rentals</li> </ul>
Los Angeles	<ul> <li>Short-term Home-sharing is permitted for primary residences</li> <li>Hosts for short-term rentals are required to register with the city of Los Angeles</li> <li>Hosting for 120+ days requires special permit</li> <li>Only long-term listings for secondary homes</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>~50% of Airbnb's listings are primary residences, which would be exempted from this restriction</li> <li>Airbnb properties are listed on average for 65 nights, which is well below 120 days</li> <li>LA regulation is most damaging to large property managers, which skew towards Vrbo</li> </ul>
London	<ul> <li>Short-term rentals are capped to 90 days total for entire properties (private rooms are exempt)</li> <li>Medium-term listings (above 90 days) require a landlord's license</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>90-day limit is below Airbnb's 65 day average and will create a barrier for OTAs who would have entered the market by acquiring large blocks of inventory</li> <li>Exemption for private rooms will benefit Airbnb versus other vacation rental competitors</li> </ul>
Paris	<ul> <li>Short-term rentals of primary residence are capped to 90 days total for whole property, and unlimited for private rooms</li> <li>Secondary homes rentals only for 1+ years</li> </ul>	Similar dynamics to London. It provides minimal disruption to individual hosts but increases barriers to vacation rental platforms
Tokyo	<ul> <li>Hosts required to required to obtain registration numbers for short-term rentals</li> <li>Short-term rentals capped to 180 days</li> </ul>	Short-term rental limits are almost 3x Airbnb's 65 day average, resulting in minimal disruption – especially to its core hosts
Barcelona	<ul> <li>Hosts must obtain a registration number for short-term rentals</li> <li>Rentals above 30 days are also permitted</li> </ul>	Registration process could slow down growth of short- term rentals. Otherwise, there are minimal restrictions

Source: Airbnb Help Center.